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ABSTRACT 
The present study was designed to examine whether 
the conservatism present in a Bayesian probability situa-
tion could be partially attributable to the sex of the 
subjects performing the task. The experimental design 
required that the subjects estimate the probabilities of 
occurrence of two independent events. They were then given 
an opportunity to revise their estimates as additional 
information was experimentally introduced into the situation. 
These estimates were compared to estimates calculated from 
Bayes• theorem. 
The results of this experiment failed to support 
the hypothesis that the female subjects would exhibit more 
conservatism than the male subjects. 
Suggested explanations for these results centered 
around the nature of the task performed and the character-
istics of the experimental situation. 
Suggestions for further research were both 
theoretical and methodological in nature. 
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Problem 
The purpose of the present study is to examine the 
phenomena of "conservatism" in probabilistic inference situ-
ations. Specifically, this study will investigate whether 
the amount of "conservatism" present in this type of situa-
tion differs according to the sex of the subject performing 
the task. The normative model to be used is Bayes' theorem. 
This model prescribes how people should behave in a situation 
which requires them to estimate the probability of occurrence 
of specific events. 11 Conservatism11 will be defined as 
failure of the subjects to perform in a manner consistent 
with this model. 
The importance of probability theory in statistics 
originally centered around the development of a "statistical 
method." The necessity for this type of method resulted 
from an increased interest in statistics during the middle 
part of the nineteenth century and consisted primarily of 
two aspects. The first aspect of this method was the 
development of a statistical method of investigation. 
Secondly, was the need for a statistical method of inference. 
The statistical method of "investigation" consisted 
primarily of investigating a phenomena and measuring it by 
various sorts of averages. The emphasis was upon studying 
variability instead of eliminating it. 
The second aspect of the statistical method, infer-
ence, was concerned with the relationship between theory 
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and observation; theory suggesting what to observe and 
observation correcting theory. It was shown, however, that 
an interplay between observation and theory was needed which 
would make observations more relevant and meaningful with 
respect to particular theories. The development of proba-
bility theory was a natural consequence of this dilemma. 
Employing the characteristics of this theory, the scientist 
could make "mathematical guesses" with respect to observa-
tions made in the long run. 
Probability theory was extended in the work of R. A. 
Fisher during the 19201 s and culminated in the work of 
Neyman and Pearson during the 19301 s. Through the careful 
development of appropriate inferential concepts and proce-
dures, a stability or orthodoxy in the theory and practice 
of probability had developed by 1940. This orthodoxy is 
presently referred to as the classical interpretation of 
probability. 
One of the primary constructs of the classical inter-
pretation is that of relative frequency. Basically, this 
principle states that "For equally likely elementary events, 
the probability of an event A is its relative frequency in 
the sample space" (Hayes, 1963, p. 56). Fisher and Neyman 
both insisted that "all probabilities referred to should 
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have a basis or interpretation in terms of frequencies" 
(Anscombe, 1964, p. 160). The probability of the data, 
therefore, denotes nothing other than its relative frequency 
to be expected in the long run. The primary purpose of 
statistical analysis is to summarize the data, collected by 
a scientist, relative to a particular phenomena, without 
considering how the particular method of analysis used might 
influence the beliefs and actions of the person employing 
them. 
One problem with the "frequentist 1 s" position is that 
it offers no direct theory of inference or of scientific 
procedure. It is concerned with how to make data meaning-
ful, not how to meaningfully collect data. 
A second problem with this position is related to the 
rules that should be used in relating mathematical properties 
to observations in the real world. Frequencies are not 
actual probabilities but only estimates of probabilities. 
The scientist is forced to work within the confines of 
finite occurrences; therefore, uncertainties are always 
present. These uncertainties cannot adequately be explained 
or described simply by means of probabilities. 
Much of the criticism directed against the classical 
school has been a result of the development of statistical 
decision theory. The importance of this development centered 
around the work of A. Wald and L. J. Savage. Wald 1 s efforts 
were primarily directed towards the scientist who was con-
sidered to be a rational decision maker. The work of 
Savage was prominent in the rehabilitation of subjective 
probability and utility. 
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The concept of utility was originally introduced by 
Danial Bernoulli (1738). He insisted that the value of an 
object could not be determined by its price but was rather 
a function of the utility it yielded. Values are therefore 
relative to the people assigning them.and are inversely 
related to the quantity of the object the person already 
possesses. Thus, they are not constant for all people but 
vary depending upon the particular situation. 
Recently the importance of this concept has been 
realized by psychologists. Miller (1964) has pointed out 
that there is a definite need for the development of a 
theory of normative application. This theory must be dis-
tinguished from descriptive theory and is primarily derived 
from logic instead of observation. Deductive logic tells 
us how we ought to think or behave, not how we do behave. 
The logician therefore specifies how people ought to think, 
not what they ought to think. Since utility is relative to 
the person assigning value to an object, there is a need 
for a normative model of utility. 
One of the leading proponents of this idea has been 
a "school" which views men as probabilistic information 
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processors. This movement, known as Bayesian statistics, 
operates from the principle that "probability is orderly 
opinion, and that inference from data is nothing other than 
the revision of such opinion in the light of relevant new 
information" (Edwards, Lindman, and Savage, 1963). Bayes• 
theorem is said to be the appropriate normative model for 
decision making situations. It prescribes how a person 
should behave if he is to be consistent with himself. As 
pointed out by Anscombe (1964, p. 161), 11 It is a theory of 
consistency of the person's body of beliefs or preferences; 
there is no consideration of ethics." His observed behav-
iors are characteristic of description only. 
The major contribution of the Bayesian movement has 
been the concept of "personal probability." Personal proba-
bilities are n ••• ideally consistent opinions, and con-
form to the axioms of probability theory ••• 11 (Peterson, 
Schneider & Miller, 1965). These probabilities are to be 
distinguished from "subjective probabilities" which are 
defined as 11 . . . a weight attached to an event by an 
individual that indicates the strength of his expectation 
that the event will occur" (Stilson, 1966, p. 79). Subjec-
tive probabilities may also be interpreted as the value 
that the occurrence of an event has for the individual; it 
is the utility of the event with respect to the person. 
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In order for personal probabilities to be both con-
sistent and orderly opinion, it is necessary that they obey 
the axioms of probability theory. No such restriction is 
placed on subjective probabilities. The two primary axioms 
that personal probabilities must conform to are: 
0 ~ p(A) ~ p(S) = 1.00 
p(AUB) : p(A) + p(B) 
(1) 
(2) 
where Sis the universal event; A and Bare any two incom-
patible or nonintersecting events; and AUB is the event 
that A or B or both A and Bare true. 
Personal probabilities exist prior to the actual 
occurrence of an event. In an experimental situation, per-
sonal probabilities may reflect the degree of confidence 
the experimenter has with respect to his hypothesis. The 
Bayesian statistician insists that such probabilities are 
present prior to the collection of data. This is due to 
the fact that experimenters are usually not naive to the 
particular problem they are studying. Background literature 
and their own professional skills are available to them. 
Thus their opinions are different from the subjective 
opinions made by people in everyday situations. The insis-
tence of these prior probabilities is the primary distin-
guishing feature between the Bayesian movement and the 
classical school. 
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One difficulty entailed in the use of subjective 
probabilities is that persons who are equally familiar with 
the situation may disagree on the probability that should 
be assigned to a given event. These results could be 
expected, however, if it is kept in mind that subjective 
probabilities involve more than the attitude of the person 
towards the event; they are also reflective of the gamble 
or risk he is willing to take with respect to the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of the event. This addition of "personal" 
into probability theory is a second contribution of the 
Bayesian movement. 
One problem raised with respect to Bayes• theorem as 
a normative model is that when subjective and objective 
probabilities are combined, the assumption must be made 
that subjective probabilities combine according to the same 
rules of mathematical probability theory as the objective 
probabilities do. Savage (1962) has demonstrated that 
" ••• subjective probabilities have the same mathematical 
properties as objective probabilities; but there the resem-
blance ends." Upon examination of the degree to which sub-
jective probability judgments conform to the Bayesian model, 
the present study assumes that subjective probabilities do 
obey the mathematical rules of probability theory. Two 
requirements for the application of Bayes• theorem and the 
rules this study assumes subjective probabilities obey are: 
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(1) The sum of all outcome probabilities in a given sample 
space must be unity; and (2) The sum of the probabilities 
of the outcomes combined in an event equals the probability 
of that event. 
Bayes• theorem is contingent upon conditional proba-
bility theory. Simply stated, if an event A has a proba-
bility of occurrence assigned to it, p(A), and if the scien-
tist assigning this probability is given some additional 
information relevant to A, such as the occurrence of event 
B, then knowledge of the occurrence of B must be considered 
when estimating p(A). The proper formula is: 
p(AIB) = p(A /lB) p(B) 
(3) 
where p(AIB) is the posterior probability of A given that B 
has occurred; the p(AnB) is the probability of A and B 
occurring jointly; and the p(B) is the prior probability of 
B occurring. 
Simple algebraic transformation of equation 3 results 
in the basic form of Bayes• theorem: 
p(AIB) = p(BIAjp(A) p(B (4) 
where A is any hypothesis; the Bis the data; the p(A) is the 
prior probability of the hypothesis under consideration 
being correct; the p(BfA) is the probability of the data 
being associated with the hypothesis; the p(B) is the prior 
probability of the data occurring; and the p(AJB) is the 
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posterior probability that the hypothesis is correct, given 
the data associated with it. 
The most widely used and appropriate technique for 
examining how people function as probabilistic information 
processors is to introduce them into an experimental situa-
tion in which they are required to choose between alternative 
events. By submitting relevant information into the situa-
tion, the amount of subjective revision can be compared to 
the normative model. Failure of subjects to behave in a 
manner consistent with this model is what has been defined 
as conservatism. 
The most consistent result of this type of experiment 
has been the presence of the conservative effect (Phillips, 
Hays, and Edwards, 1965). These investigators asked sub-
jects to decide whether detected aerial activity was indica-
tive of enemy attack, friendly activity, meteor shower, or 
an enemy attempt to "spoof" the surveillance system. After 
recording their decision, the subjects were given additional 
information about more aerial activity. They were then asked 
to record another estimate with respect to the four events 
under consideration. This procedure was followed for 
thirty-two presentations of information. The results of 
their study demonstrated the small amount of subjective 
revision made by the subjects when Bayesian probabilities 
showed considerable change. 
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These findings indicate that human beings are fallible 
when it comes to processing information; that the 1average 1 
person is not able to utilize all the information available 
to him. Also these findings indicate that subjects are not 
consistent in their use of the information they are proces-
sing. 
Peterson and Miller (1965) attempted to compensate for 
the conservative effect by manipulating both the prior odds 
in favor of a hypothesis and the theoretical impact of the 
datum. A large number of dice, distinguished by different 
numbers of black versus white sides, were placed in an urn 
in varying proportions. For each trial the die with the 
greater number of black sides was termed Ha and the die with 
the greater number of white sides was termed Hb. The experi-
menter drew a single die from the urn and asked the subject 
to set prior probability estimates for Ha and Hb. He then 
rolled the die from a cup and informed the subject which 
side turned up. On the basis of this information the sub-
ject revised his estimates about which die had been rolled. 
The theoretical impact of the data was manipulated by 
drawing either Ha or Hb from the urn. The prior probability 
of the hypothesis was manipulated by varying the proportion 
of white sides to black sides in the urn. These investiga-
tors failed to reduce the conservative effect; in fact, as 
the difference between Bayesian prior and posterior 
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probabilities increased, conservatism increased. 
Schum (1966) presented to subjects six classes of 
data describing the characteristics of a military deploy-
ment. The subjects were required to decide whether this 
information represented war, a forthcoming attack, or 
simply a maneuver. Conditional non-independency of data 
was controlled by the prior selection of the particular 
information to be presented. It was found that the use of 
non-independent data failed to reduce the amount of conser-
vatism present. 
In a series of three experiments, Phillips and 
Edwards (1966) examined the effect of the diagnostic value 
of the data, payoffs, and response modes on conservatism. 
In the first experiment the diagnostic value of the data 
was reflected by the likelihood ratio, a ratio describing 
the occurrence of the data dependent upon the separate 
probabilities of the two hypotheses under consideration, 
as a function of the numerical difference between the cues 
sampled. The subjects were told to imagine ten paper bags, 
each bag containing one hundred poker chips with red chips 
prodominant in r bags and blue chips prodominant in 10-r 
bags. They were then shown one bag and told that it had 
randomly been drawn from the ten. After being asked to 
estimate whether an r or 10-r bag had been chosen, the 
experimenter explained that with no other information given, 
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the best estimates that could be made were r/10 and 10-r/10. 
If the subjects estimates differed from the suggested esti-
mates, they were asked to change them. All subjects, there-
fore, started with the same probability estimates. The 
experimenter then drew twenty chips from the bag and dis-
played them, one at a time, to the subjects. After each 
chip was displayed, the subjects were asked to revise their 
previous estimates. This procedure was repeated twenty-four 
times. 
Results of this experiment indicated that as data 
became more diagnostic (likelihood ratio approached one), 
subjects became more Bayesian, however conservatism was 
present for all the subjects. 
In the second experiment the effect of motivation on 
conservatism was investigated. The design and procedure 
for this experiment was basically the same as the first 
experiment. The three primary differences between them 
were that the proportion of chips in each bag was a constant 
70-30; all the sequences in experiment II started with 
probabilities of 50-50; and only twenty sequences were 
presented. 
Three experimental groups and one control group were 
used for their second experiment. Experimental Group I 
received payoffs that were logarithmically related to their 
subjective estimates; Experimental Group II received payoffs 
quadratically related to their estimates; Experimental 
Group III received payoffs linearally related to their 
estimates; and the Control Group received no payoffs. 
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Following each sequence of twenty draws of chips, 
the subjects were told which hypothesis was correct. Each 
subject then spun a spinner which selected one of his 
twenty pairs of estimates. His estimate for the correct 
hypothesis on the chosen pair determined the amount of pay-
off. The subjects were aware throughout the experiment of 
the number of 11 pointsn they were accumulating. Following 
the experiment their points were converted into money. 
The results of this experiment showed that payoffs 
had a positive effect on the amount of conservatism present. 
Experimental Group III (linear payoffs) exhibited less con-
servatism than the other three groups. The authors con-
cluded that in probabilistic inference situations where 
small between subject variance is desired, payoffs should 
be used. 
Experiment III was conducted to test the effect that 
the method of recording estimates had on conservatism. The 
design and procedure were basically the same as the first 
experiment. Four different methods of recording estimates 
were tested. Group I recorded their estimates by placing 
metal washers in two vertical troughs (discrete method). 
Group II verbalized their estimates while an experimenter 
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recorded them. Groups III and IV were called the logarith-
mic continuous groups. Group III recorded estimates by 
setting a sliding pointer on a scale of odds spaced loga-
rithmically. Group IV recorded their estimates on a scale 
where the size of the intervals was determined by converting 
the probabilities to odds and scaling the odds. None of 
the groups were told which hypothesis was correct and no 
payoffs were received. 
Results of this experiment indicate that the method 
of recording estimates does not eliminate conservatism. 
The estimates for the verbal and logarithmic odds groups 
were less conservative than Group I; however, all subjects 
consistently failed to significantly approach the normative 
model. 
As a result of these three experiments, Phillips and 
Edwards concluded that the failure of subjects to extract 
from the data all the certainty that is experimentally 
available is consistent and orderly and may reflect a general 
limitation on human ability to process information. 
Due to the amount of experimental manipulation employed 
in these three experiments, the present investigater is 
hesitant to accept them as sufficient evidence for the above 
conclusion. It is possible that conservatism was encouraged 
in these experiments and that in the absence of the different 
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manipulatory techniques the amount of conservatism present 
would have been of a smaller magnitude. 
Motivation in a probabilistic inference situation 
may be influenced by variables other than payoffs. A large 
quantity of information may be overwhelming enough to pre-
vent optimal performance by the subjects. Likewise, small 
quantities of information may be ineffective as motivators 
thus resulting in conservative behavior. 
This problem was investigated by Peterson, Schneider, 
and Miller (1965). In an experiment involving the drawing 
of black and white marbles from one of two beakers, the 
effect of sample size, quantity of information presented, 
was investigated. For Group I the marbles were drawn one 
at a time; for Group II they were drawn four at a time; 
for Group III they were drawn twelve at a time; and for 
Group IV they were drawn forty-eight at a time. Following 
each draw the subjects were required to estimate which 
beaker was being used. They were subsequently told which 
hypothesis was correct after a total of forty-eight marbles 
had been drawn. 
Employing this design results in only three of the 
groups making probability revisions. Group IV received all 
forty-eight marbles in one draw; therefore, revision was 
not required. Since Bayes' theorem is the normative model 
for estimate revision, it is questionable whether the 
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results of this group can be analyzed with respect to it. 
The results of this study indicate that sample size 
influences the conservative effect. The larger the sample 
size the more was the amount of revision; however, it 
occurred at the expense of revision accuracy, or increased 
conservatism. Size of the sample and revision accuracy 
were therefore found to be inversely related. These authors 
concluded that subjects are able to work with only a limited 
amount of information if they are to maintain revision 
accuracy. 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) administered a five-hour 
battery of tests to 114 male subjects and 103 female sub-
jects to investigate the various aspects of decision making 
and risk taking. The primary purpose of this research was 
" ••• an attempt to look at human thinking and problem 
solving from the point of view of the risks, potential 
costs, and potential gains that may face the individual as 
he proceeds in his efforts" (Kogan, et al., p. 1). Decision 
making involves alternatives and the avoidance or acceptance 
of various alternatives are likely to be important ingre-
dients in the thinking process. The results of this study 
are to be accepted as descriptive and not explanatory of 
decision making processes; statements of explanation await 
future research. 
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The tests administered in the Kogan and Wallach 
study primarily involved measures of extremeness of judg-
ment, extremeness of self rating, the personality factors 
of anxiety and defensiveness, and various measures of deci-
sion making strategies. 
The findings of this research are relevant to the 
present paper for four reasons: (1) Probabilistic infer-
ence situations require decision making on the part of the 
subjects; (2) This type of situation also requires the pro-
cessing of additional information and the opportunity for 
subjective estimate revision; (3) Subjective estimates are 
reflective of the motivational aspects operative in the 
situation; (4) The present study also involves a situation 
in which the subjects have no control over the problem 
outcome. Of particular importance to the present paper are 
the results which report differences found between the male 
and female subjects. Since the effect of sex as a modera-
tor variable in decision making situations has received 
little attention in the past, Kogan and Wallach reported 
their results separately by sex throughout their paper. 
In general, it was found that males exhibited greater 
confidence of judgment than females. This was evidenced by 
the fact that they were more sensitive with respect to when 
certain strategies ceased to payoff or be effective. The 
male subjects appeared more alert to the subtle distinctions 
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between their specific task requirements and as a result 
adopted more risky but less extreme strategies than the 
female subjects. These results were especially evident in 
situations where the subjects had no personal control over 
the problem outcomes. 
These investigators concluded that behavior in 
decision making situations is attributable primarily to 
failure-avoidance in females and image-maintenance in males. 
Also, manifest anxiety is related to conservatism of strategy 
preferences in males only, while rigidity yields a much more 
pervasive pattern of relationships with conservatism in 
females. In females, therefore, it was found that there was 
a direct relation between impulsiveness and risk taking under 
these hypothetical conditions. 
The present study is concerned with whether the above 
described results are operative in an experimental situation 
employing two specific experimental conditions. The first 
condition is that subjects be required to choose between two 
specific alternative events and that by introducing additional 
information they be given the opportunity to revise their 
subjective estimates or opinions. The second condition is 
that the subjects have no control over the outcome of the 
problem. 
The hypotheses of the present investigation are 
therefore twofold. First, it will be shown that conservatism 
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is present when comparing the performance of human subjects 
to Bayes• theorem in this type of situation; secondly, it 
will be demonstrated that female subjects exhibit more 
conservatism than male subjects. 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty-three volunteer students, 28 females and 15 
males, from Psychology of Adjustment classes at Central 
Washington State College served as Ss. 
Apparatus 
The stimulus cues consisted of 1000 cardboard squares 
(l"xl") and 1000 cardboard right triangles (l"xl"xl.4"). 
These cues were distributed in two wooden boxes {8"x8"x811 ) 
in the proportion of 600 squares and 400 triangles in one 
box, Rs, and 600 triangles and 400 squares in the other box, 
Ht. Large numbers of figures were used so that, with con-
tinual mixing, sampling without replacement could be con-
sidered a reasonable approximation of sampling with replace-
ment. 
Both boxes were painted with red enamel paint and had 
a yellow square or triangle painted on one side of them. 
The particular figure represented that the highest frequency 
of this geometric figure was contained in this box. Other 
apparatus consisted of standard overhead projector (see 
reference); a standard Radiant Wall movie screen; one 
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Wollensak tape recorder, Model T-1616 Electronic Control; 
one reel of Scotch Magnetic Tape, Tartan Series 141; two 
transparencies, one divided into 18 rectangles (Appendix A), 
and the other with an example of the Ss recording sheets 
drawn on it (Appendix B); a standard classroom table; two 
pair of eyebrow tweezers; a black wooden barrier (33 11 xl2 11 x 
1511 ); and Ss response sheets for each trial (Appendix C). 
Procedure 
The experimental design required the presentation of 
certain information and an evaluation of the effect upon 
revision of subjective probabilities as a result of this 
information. The two boxes with varying proportions of 
squares and triangles were the alternative events (hypotheses) 
available to the subjects (Ss). Each trial consisted of the 
random selection of 36 cues from one of the boxes. After 
each trial, the Ss were shown from which box the cues had 
been drawn. 
Two assistants aided the experimenter (E) in conduc-
ting the experiment. One of the assistants, voluntarily 
chosen from among the Ss, was responsible for drawing the 
sample of stimulus cues from the box. This assistant was 
chosen in this manner to eliminate experimenter bias. The 
second assistant, pre-arranged by E, recorded the stimulus 
cues as they were drawn from the box. This information was 
necessary for computation of Bayesian probabilities. 
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There was a total of ten trials. Each trial con-
sisted of drawing 18 pairs of stimulus cues from one of the 
two boxes. Following each draw of a pair of cues, the Ss 
were required to make two estimates. Their first estimate 
was with respect to Rs being the correct hypothesis. Their 
second estimate was with respect to Ht being correct. To 
insure that their subjective estimates obeyed the same 
mathematical rules as Bayesian probabilities, the Ss were 
told that their estimates for Rs and Ht on any one draw 
must sum to unity. 
The experiment began by Ss receiving taped instruc-
tions (Appendix D) as to what was meant by probability 
estimates, the nature of the experimental procedure, and 
the nature of their specific task. Each Shad a copy of 
the instructions. Since the instructions themselves could 
encourage conservatism, it was important that they were 
neither directive nor suggestive as to what estimates should 
be made. A pilot study of 27 Ss was run to insure that the 
instructions were completely clear as to the nature of the 
experimental situation. 
Trial 1 began by E flipping a coin to determine which 
box would be used. The boxes had been placed behind a 
wooden barrier which was located on a table situated between 
the Ss and the projector. After determining which box 
would be used, E removed this box from behind the barrier 
22 
and handed it to the subject assistant seated next to the 
projector. Since the box was visible to the Ss as it was 
handed to the assistant, it was necessary to conceal the 
geometric figure from their vision. After handing the box 
to the assistant, E sat on the opposite side of the 
projector. 
With a pair of tweezers in each hand, the assistant 
randomly drew a pair of figures out of the box. These cues 
were handed to E who placed them on the first square of the 
transparency on the projector. This method of displaying 
the cues was decided on so that each S could clearly see 
which cues had been drawn. The cue in the assistant's 
right hand was placed on the right side of the square. All 
triangle cues faced the same direction. 
Following this drawing of the first pair of cues, 
the Ss were required to make probability estimates with 
respect to Hs and Ht. These estimates were recorded on 
provided record sheets. After a period of five seconds, 
the subject assistant drew a second pair of cues from the 
box. These cues were displayed by E in the second square 
of the transparency. The Ss were then required to make 
two more estimates. This procedure continued until 36 cues 
(18 pairs) had been drawn from the box. 
After the drawing of the last pair of cues, E picked 
up the box and placed it in front of the barrier with the 
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geometric figure exposed to the Ss. Ethen returned the 
box behind the barrier. Following this the boxes were 
shuffled by E to prevent the Ss detection of the correct 
box by placement. Ethen flipped a coin to determine which 
box would be used for trial 2. All ten trials followed 
this same procedure. 
Since the estimates made by the Ss offered no infor-
mation with respect to the particular approach to the prob-
lem adopted by them, the Ss were asked to fill out a ques-
tionnaire following the testing session (Appendix E). This 
questionnaire primarily investigated their attitude towards 
the task and the particular approach they used to determine 
whether Hs or Ht was the correct hypothesis. 
Peterson, Schneider, and Miller (1965) have demon-
strated that Ss are able to process only limited amounts of 
information if they are to attain revision accuracy. To 
maintain accuracy in the present study, the cues were 
sampled in pairs. The total number of cues drawn, 36, was 
decided upon as a result of the functional area of the over-
head projector. Using this procedure, Ss made a total of 
180 estimates. 
Results 
The present experiment required the Ss to make sub-
jective estimates about the occurrence of two independent 
events. These estimates were then compared, at the end of 
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each trial, to estimates derived from Bayes' theorem. The 
appropriate statistic for making this comparison was the 
accuracy ratio. This ratio is a comparison between the sub-
jective odds in favor of Hs and the corresponding Bayesian 
odds in favor of the same hypothesis. 
Relation of Odds to Probabilities 
The odds ~ 0 (Hs) are related to the probability of Hs 
by the following equation: 
-R,o (Hs) 1.00-p(Hs) = p(Hs) (5) 
Simply stated: if the probability of an event Hs is equal 
to p(Hs), the odds in favor of the event are p(Hs) to 1.00-p(Hs)• 
Therefore odds and probability are related to each other as 
follows: 
( 6) 
Part of hypothesis testing in the Bayesian system is finding 
the posterior probability of Hs, (HslD), or equivalently, 
finding the posterior odds -R-.i.(Hs lD) in favor of Hs· 
Measure of Estimate Revision 
Bayes• theorem is a consequence of conditional proba-
bility theory and is therefore appropriate for calculating 
the probability of Hypothesis Has a result of information 
provided by the occurrence of Datum D. The basic form of 
Bayes• theorem presented in the introduction of this paper 
was: 
p(HID) = p(D/H))(H) 
p(D 
( 4) 
where p(HjD) is equal to the posterior probability of H; 
p(DIH) is the probability of the data given that H has 
occurred; p(H) is the prior probability of H; and p(D) is 
the prior probability of Datum D. An equation for two 
hypotheses which was relevant to this paper was obtained 
by dividing Equation 4 for Hs by Equation 4 for Ht: 
(7) 
25 
where p(Hs)D)/p(HtlD) is a ratio describing the posterior 
odds of Hs to Ht as a result of a single Datum D; the 
p(D/Hs)/p(D!Ht) is a ratio describing the likelihood of D 
dependent upon the odds of Hs to Ht; and the p(Hs)/p(Ht) is 
a ratio describing the prior odds of Hs to Ht· Equation 5 
may be written more simply as: 
..f?,= L .5?-o (8) 
where .f2 1 are the posterior odds in favor of Hs; L is the 
likelihood ratio; and~0 are the prior odds in favor of Hs· 
From equation 6 it can be seen that the posterior odds are 
equal to the product of the likelihood ratio and the prior 
odds in favor of Hs· Since the prior odds of the present 
experiment were equal to 1:1 at the beginning of each trial, 
the posterior odds were equal to the likelihood ratio. 
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Likelihood Ratio 
The likelihood ratio specifies the likelihood of the 
particular datum occurring and is defined as "the proba-
bility of the datum on one hypothesis divided by its proba-
bility on the other hypothesis" (Edwards, Lindman, & Phillips, 
1965, p. 302). The likelihood ratio is therefore an odds 
ratio and was calculated in favor of Hs for the present 
experiment. 
Calculation of Likelihood Ratios 
Likelihood ratios for both the subjective estimates 
(SLLR) and the Bayesian estimates (BLLR) were calculated. 
The SLLRs were calculated by converting the posterior proba-
bility estimates of the subjects into posterior odds in 
favor of Hs• These odds were then transformed into Log 
posterior odds. Conversion of subjective estimates into 
Log odds necessitated that the most extreme estimates of 
certainty acceptable in this experiment be 99 and 1. 
The BLLRs for the present experiment were calculated 
as suggested by Edwards, et. al. (1965, p. 300). Briefly, 
if the probability of drawing a square from the box is E. 
and the probability of drawing a triangle is q, then the 
probability of drawing any particular sample is prqn-r, 
where r is equal to the actual number of squares drawn and 
n-r is equal to the actual number of triangles drawn. 
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The BLLRs for the present study are the odds-
likelihood ratio form of Bayes• theorem. They are the 
ratios depicting the probability of the datum given the box 
being used containing 600 squares divided by the probability 
of the same datum given that the correct box contains 600 
triangles. These BLLRs were calculated as follows: 
(p/q)r -(n-r) (9) 
These BLLRs were transformed into Log posterior odds. They 
were therefore equal to .17609 times the difference between 
the number of squares and triangles sampled on each trial. 
A BLLR was indeterminate on any trial with equal cue sam-
pling. The BLLRs and corresponding probabilities for the 
present experiment are presented in Tabler. 
On Trial 9 of this study the number of squares and 
triangles sampled was equal. To maintain between subject 
variance of Ss on this trial, the accuracy ratio used to 
depict the Ss performance was the mean accuracy ratio for 
each Son the other 9 trials. This procedure was preferred 
to computing a grand mean accuracy ratio so that the data 
would continue to represent individual performance. The 
degrees of freedom for the appropriate error term were 
reduced by 30. 
TABLE 1 
Bayesian Likelihood Ratios and Corresponding 
Probabilities Per Trial 
Trial BLLR p(Hs) 
1 2.465 .996 
2 1.760 .982 
3 1.408 .962 
4 • 352 • 692 
5 .704 .834 
6 1.056 .919 
7 2.113 .992 
8 1.056 .919 
9 * • 600 
10 .352 • 692 
*A BLLR for trial 9 was indeterminate. 
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Relation of SLLR to BLLR 
The dependent variable relating the SLLRs to the 
BLLRs in the present experiment was the accuracy ratio. 
This ratio has been defined by Peterson and Miller (1965) 
as: 
SLLR 
BLLR 
(10) 
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If the Ss 1 estimates were revised with the same magnitude 
as the Bayesian estimates, the accuracy ratio was equal to 
1.00. An accuracy ratio of less than 1.00 was accepted as 
evidence of conservatism. 
The accuracy ratios and standard deviations per trial 
are presented in Table 2. These results support the first 
hypothesis of this experiment. Figure 1 offers further evi-
dence that conservatism was present in this situation. From 
this figure it can be seen that Ss most nearly approximated 
the Bayesian estimates on trials 4, 9, and 10. Examination 
of Table 3 shows that on trials 4 and 10 the frequency with 
which the cues were sampled from the box was 19 squares and 
17 triangles while on trial 9 this ratio was 50:50. Since 
the Bayesian estimates were calculated in favor of Hs with 
respect to Datum D, these estimates would be lower on those 
trials which most nearly approximated equal sampling of cues. 
The fact that Ss 1 estimates on these trials were less con-
servative than their estimates on the remaining seven trials 
Table 2 
Mean Accuracy Ratio and Standard Deviation 
Per Trial n = 43 
Trial SLLR SD 
BLlR 
1 .242 .243 
2 .123 .112 
3 .107 .138 
4 • 534 2.557 
5 .392 1.670 
6 .259 1.241 
7 .295 1.382 
8 .212 1.114 
9 • 682 1.080 
10 • 696 3.489 
* An accuracy ratio deviation from 1.00 indicates 
conservatism 
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Table 3 
Frequency of Stimulus Cues and Correct 
Hypothesis Per Trial 
Trial Squares Triangles Correct 
1 25 11 Hs 
2 23 13 Ht 
3 22 14 Ht 
4 19 17 Hs 
5 20 16 Hs 
6 21 15 Ht 
7 24 12 Hs 
8 21 15 Ht 
9 18 18 Hs 
10 19 17 Ht 
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Hypo. 
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suggests that they were operating or processing the informa-
tion available. However, it is also possible that the §_s 
were continuing to function as consistently imperfect infor-
mation processors. The higher accuracy ratios on trials 4, 
9, and 10 may be only a matter of circumstance with respect 
to the lower BLLRs. No data is available to show which of 
the two above possibilities were operative on these trials. 
To perform the analysis of variance to examine the 
differences in conservatism due to the particular sex of 
the subjects, the 28 female §_s were randomly divided into 
two groups of n=l3 and n=15. Due to the specific nature of 
the experimental situat1cn, random division of the female 
Ss was preferred to introducing 13 more male §_s to the task. 
Since a second group of males would have to be exposed to 
the same cue situation as the original group, this section 
would fail to meet the standards of randomization required 
for this experiment. A non-significant t-value of 
t•.019(df•26) between the differences of the two female 
groups allowed analysis or variance to be performed on the 
subsample of 15 females. 
A summary or the analysis of variance appears 1n 
Table 4. The difference in the amount of conservatism due 
to the .§_s sex was not significant. This analysis suggests 
that the amount or conservatism displayed by the female §.;a 
with respect to Hs was of the same general magnitude as 
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that displayed by the male Ss. Examination of the accuracy 
ratios for the female Ss and the male Ss on each trial 
support this analysis. These accuracy ratios are presented 
in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. 
The trials effect of Table 4 reached significance 
beyond the p<.001 level. These results offer evidence 
that as the trials progressed both groups of Ss acquired 
some 11 skill 11 in their use of the cue information. However, 
it must be kept in mind that the possibility advanced earlier, 
that the Ss 1 estimates remained consistently imperfect but 
were less conservative towards the end of the experiment 
because the Bayesian estimates were lower on these later 
trials, is still tenable. 
From the non-significant AB interaction of Table 4, 
it may be concluded that the female Ss adjusted to the 
situation with relatively the same magnitude as the Male Ss. 
Examinations of Tables 5 and 6 support this conclusion. 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table 
n = 30 
Source ss df ms 
Between Subjects 10.816 29 
A (sex) .523 1 .534 
Subjects within Groups 10.293 28 .367 
Within Subjects 67.280 270 
B (trials) 9.239 9 1.026 
AB ( sex over trials) 2.091 9 .232 
Bx Ss within Groups 56.250 222 .253 
** p < .001 
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F 
1.425 
4.055** 
.917 
Table 5 
Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=l5 Female Subjects 
TRIALS 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .341 .177 .058 .444 .197 .0001 .077 
2 .019 .052 .058 .444 .296 .107 .on 
3 .003 .560 .039 .749 .012 .869 .077 
4 .341 777 • _,_ ( I .117 .444 .592 "Z.C::l ._,,,,./ ..... .770 
----
5 .341 • lj6 .039 • U;.l~ 1.973 8?-o • \.} ,.I .770 
-·--·· 
6 .341 .117 .3,~9 4. 1r1+0 1.970 .860 .7?0 
~~------
7 .001 .001 .156 1J ~!~4 .197 .132 .077 
8 .341 .l ff"-C . _, ,/ .012 .0001 .028 .770 
9 .341 .177 .156 .562 .197 .132 .069 
10 .341 .o4o .090 .444 .296 .263 .023 
11 .003 .177 .090 .444 .241 .204 .069 
12 .341 .o4o .156 .249 .021 .204 .030 
13 .341 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .869 .770 
14 .013 .177 .090 .015 .197 .132 .011 
15 .341 .156 .039 .562 .790 .869 .770 
8 
.869 
.107 
.351 
.,-, 
..., ' ._,,,._,_ 
2·:::-'"'! 
•J.,)-'--
.. 
.CC'Ol 
.132 
.021 
.123 
.869 
3c:;1 . _,_ 
.132· 
.869 
.132 
.869 
9 
.733 
.181 
.378 
.398 
c:::.e;Q, 
• _,I,/ 'v 
.995 
.176 
.260 
.310 
.312 
.224 
.132 
.316 
.134 
.981 
10 
4.440 
.542 
.749 
41,1, 
e r..,.. 
.444 
.0001 
.444 
.963 
1.030 
.444 
.444 
.018 
.0001 
.444 
4.440 t.v 
0\ 
Subject 1 
1 .341 
2 .341 
3 .341 
4 }, "'Z ') •l..,).,j_ 
-· 
~~ ......-,,p, ..___ 
5 .31+1 
C. 
.341 v 
_...,~--- -··--
7 r,-·,c • \..,-~ .r' 
--
8 .c1B2 
-----··--p-k 
9 .341 
10 .003 
11 .341 
12 .341 
13 .341 
14 .341 
15 .341 
Table 6 
Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=15 Male Subjects 
TRIALS 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
.017 .058 .667 ,296 .263 .o43 
.177 .039 .0001 .197 .087 .770 
.177 .741 .444 .241 .137 .077 
.177 , r=C. .444 .592 • 1+96 .770 •..L,.,,)V 
.177 .039 .749 .597 .132 .770 
.017 .001 .441+ .241 .162 .030 
.003 .001 .562 .460 .869 .043 
.156 .085 .444 .365 .162 .030 
.177 .0001 .249 .016 .869 .770 
.017 .039 .444 .197 .087 .077 
.052 .117 ,.440 .197 .132 .023 
.069 .039 .749 .241 .204 .023 
.177 .076 .562 .592 .132 .770 
.177 .090 .444 .296 .162 .146 
.177 .389 .444 .790 ,351 .770 
8 9 
.520 .194 
.052 .184 
.132 .303 
.351 .461 
.132 300 • ./ ,I 
.162 .215 
.132 .292 
.162 .218 
.869 .L~l5 
.087 .155 
.132 .209 
.132 .260 
.869 .438 
.162 .262 
.204 .445 
10 
.015 
.0001 
.444 
.882 
.667 
.542 
.542 
.480 
.444 
.444 
.444 
.542 
.426 
.542 
.542 w --:i 
Subject 1 
1 .341 
2 .341 
3 .013 
4 .341 
5 .013 
6 .341 
7 .OCl 
8 .341 
9 .013 
10 .341 
11 .341 
12 .341 
13 .030 
Table 7 
Observed Accuracy Ratios for n=l3 Female Subjects 
TRIALS 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
.052 .117 1.332 .197 .869 .023 
.0001 .090 .444 .296 .204 .011 
.o4o .117 .444 .197 .263 .009 
~--. ., 
.17? .072 .I+44 .296 .132 .017 
.05.:2 .001 .444 .592 .087 .030 
.1n .3~39 .4Lt4 .592 .790 .030 
.032 .0:,7 .444 .213 .107 .017 
---
.177 .117 .562 .296 .132 .011 
.040 .090 .444 .460 .162 .023 
.177 .058 .444 .592 .263 .770 
.177 .117 .749 .592 .204 .770 
.177 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .770 
.o4o .005 .015 .241 .132 .043 
~ 
.869 
.052 
.1c7 
.132 
.n37 
.263 
.162 
.132 
.204 
.263 
.087 
.0001 
.204 
9 10 
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Discussion 
This study was designed to investigate the concept 
of conservatism in a Bayesian probability situation. The 
presence of conservatism was reflected by the accuracy ratio, 
presently defined as a ratio between the log subjective odds 
in favor of the occurrence of one specific event and the 
corresponding Bayesian log odds in favor of the same event. 
Evidence is offered to support the hypothesis that conserva-
tism was present in a situation requiring Ss to make proba-
bility estimates with respect to the occurrence or non-
occurrence of two mutually exclusive events. 
Secondly, this study investigated the possibility 
that females would exhibit more conservatism than males in 
this situation. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Bayes• theorem has been used as an appropriate norma-
tive model for experiments investigating the adequacy of sub-
jective estimates (estimates made by people). This type of 
situation typically requires Ss to make probability estimates, 
given certain relevant information, about the occurrence of 
two or more independent events. These estimates are then 
compared with estimates calculated by Bayes' theorem for a 
measure of how adequately the Ss are utilizing the available 
information. 
A consistent result of these studies has been that 
subjects fail to approximate the normative model prescribing 
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their behavior. This phenomena, conservatism, has been 
offered as evidence that 11 ••• men are suboptimal pro-
cessors of probability information" (Hays, 1963, p. 263). 
It has been suggested that subjects are unable to process 
all the information relevant to the situation and that they 
are inconsistent in their use of the information they are 
able to use. This may be one limitation on human behavior. 
The controversy with respect to the Bayesian movement 
does not center around the statistical use of Bayes' theorem. 
Since Bayes• theorem is a direct consequence of conditional 
probability theory, it is not controversial with respect to 
its use in calculating the appropriate conditional proba-
bilities in the above described situation. Instead, the 
present controversy is primarily directed towards the use of 
Bayes' theorem as a normative model prescribing how people 
should behave. It can be concluded that men are "suboptimal" 
processors of information with respect to Bayes• theorem 
only if Bayes• theorem is the appropriate model for pre-
scribing 11 optimal11 behavior. That this is the case has not 
been adequately demonstrated. 
One difference between subjective and Bayesian estimates 
is that estimates derived from Bayes' theorem are required 
to obey the additivity principle, or sum to unity. No such 
requirement is required of subjective estimates. To the 
contrary, evidence is available to suggest that subjective 
estimates do not obey this principle. 
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Holmberg (1964) has conducted an experiment to inves-
tigate the additivity of subjective estimates. He found 
that the Ss estimates significantly failed to sum to unity. 
Those estimates which obeyed the additivity principle were 
primarily reflected in terms of "round" numbers (50:50, 
60:40, 70:30, etc.). From these results he concluded that 
when unity was attained it was not on the basis of accurately 
estimating the separate probabilities. It was primarily 
attributable to a bias of estimates towards 50 per cent, or 
possibly convenience. 
The present experiment, therefore, required the Ss 
estimates on any given presentation of cues to sum to unity; 
which was 100 in this study. Although it is possible that 
this manipulation placed a 11 psychological" restraint on the 
subjects• estimates, the present investigator felt that this 
control was necessary in order to insure that subjective 
estimates obeyed the same principles as Bayesian estimates. 
Since no indication was given by the Ss that they were 
aware they were only making one estimate, it is possible 
that this control failed to hamper or restrain their per-
formance. 
A second difference between subjective and Bayesian 
estimates is the distinction between psychological and 
mathematical probabilities. The information utilized by 
Bayes• theorem and that utilized by subjects are obviously 
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different in nature. Bayes• theorem functions completely 
within the boundaries established by the separate prior 
probabilities of the alternatives under consideration and 
the cue proportions and sampled frequencies available. 
Such probabilities are "immune" to all other extraneous 
experimental variable. 
Subjective estimates, however, are possibly reflec-
tive of more than these factors. Other variables influenc-
ing the performance of the subjects are his preferences for 
shapes, sizes, and colors. For example, in the present 
study three subjects expressed on the questionnaire filled 
out following the testing session that they had personal 
preferences for squares. One female subject reported, 11 I 
liked squares better than triangles although I often felt 
I was wrong." Another subject reported, "I determined my 
estimates by the number of squares and triangles drawn, 
but I had a bias towards squares for some unexplainable 
reason. 11 These statements are suggestive that the geome-
tric cues in this study had 11 meaning 11 to the subjects 
independent of the cue sampling on each trial. 
Other variables which may affect subjective estimates 
are the time of day that the experiment is conducted, the 
nature of the specific task being performed, and the indivi-
dual's previous attitudes and values. Out of the 30 subjects 
used for the analysis of variance of this study, 5 female 
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and 10 male subjects expressed that they found the task 
interesting; however, only one male subject found the task 
uninteresting, while 4 female subjects expressed this 
attitude. Nine female subjects and 12 male subjects stated 
that they found it challenging, while only 2 females and 1 
male expressed that it was boring. These results indicate 
that definite attitudes towards the experimental task were 
operative in the situation. These attitudes were possibly 
reflected in the subjects estimates. If the Bayesians 
insist that probability estimates are reflective of the 
persons making them, then the above factors must be consi-
dered in this type of situation. Since probabilities 
calculated from Bayes• theorem are not reflective of such 
factors, it is questionable if Bayes• theorem is the appro-
priate model for prescribing human behavior. 
Stilson (1966, p. 79) points out that a second ques-
tion related to the present controversy is the measurement 
of subjective estimates. He suggests that "The determina-
tion of subjective probabilities is a problem in psycholo-
gical measurement." He further suggests that an adequate 
measure of subjective probabilities will require more pre-
cise measurement of the variables affecting them. The 
appropriate method of measurement and the identification 
of the variables to be measured are problems which can only 
be answered by further research. 
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In summary, it has been assumed in the past that be-
cause Bayes• theorem is derived from conditional probability 
theory, it is the appropriate or adequate normative model 
for prescribing behavior in a conditional probability situa-
tion. Two suggestions are presented by the present author. 
First, it is accepted that Bayes• theorem is the appropriate 
mathematical model for calculating the conditional proba-
bilities in Bayesian probability situations, but it cannot 
be assumed nor has it been demonstrated th.at it is the 
appropriate normative model prescribing how people should 
behave in these situations. 
Secondly, it is suggested that psychologists should 
possibly concern themselves more with the identification and 
measurement of the variables which affect subjective esti-
mates. One such variable, the sex of the subject performing 
the task, was investigated in the present study. Another 
important variable would be utility, or how important it 
was to the subject to be correct in his choice. It seems 
likely that both the personality and the preferences of the 
subject are operative in a non-payoff situation as well as 
a situation offering monetary rewards. With the proper 
identification of these variables, it may then be possible 
to derive a model which would combine them in a manner that 
would more adequately prescribe human behavior. The possi-
bility of such a model primarily depends on" ••• our 
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ability to observe the right things in the right ways under 
the right circumstances" (Hays, 1963, p. 46). 
The present experiment failed to offer evidence that 
the results of the Kogan and Wallach research would be 
operative in this situation. A number of possible explana-
tions may account for these results. In their study the 
subjects physically manipulated the apparatus or were 
allowed to interrupt the testing session when they had 
reached a decision. No such procedures were operative in 
the present study. The Kogan et al. results therefore may 
be primarily due to the 11 physical11 manipulation of the test-
ing procedure by the subjects. The absence of the opportunity 
for this type of involvement in the present study may have 
affected the approaches adopted by the subjects in such a 
manner as to eliminate the differences in conservatism that 
Kogan and his colleagues found between male and female sub-
jects. Further research is needed to investigate the possi-
bility that the degree to which the subject is allowed to 
participate in the experimental session markedly affects 
the amount of conservatism present. 
Kogan and Wallach also found that females were more 
conservative in a payoff situation. These results were not 
evident in the present non-payoff experiment. It is suggested, 
therefore, that payoffs may not only be necessary to enhance 
the subject's potential in making probability estimates, but 
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that the effects of payoffs are not the same for both sexes. 
Further research should concentrate not only on the types of 
reinforcement and the amounts necessary to maximize human 
judgment, but should investigate the relationship between 
the subject 1 s sex and reinforcement. 
In the Kogan and Wallach study it was reported that 
female subjects tended to adopt more extreme but less risky 
strategies than male subjects. The present study does offer 
some evidence in support of this conclusion. The term 
"strategy" is presently used the same as in game theory and 
is defined as" ••• the selection of a probability distri-
bution over events and the subsequent use of this distribu-
tion at each trial in a series to determine the particular 
succession of choices to be made." (Siegel, Siegel & 
Andrews, 1964, p. 6). 
The male subjects in the present study adopted more 
risky strategies in approaching a solution to the problem 
than the female subjects. One male reported, "If the 
figures were equal I estimated 50:50. Each time the cues 
were unequal I added 5 per cent for each figure with the 
greatest frequency." A second male subject reported that, 
"The cue with the lowest frequency in the box used on the 
previous trial would, by law of average, be less likely to 
be drawn. If this minority symbol approached 50 per cent on 
the present trial, I would choose that box." A third male 
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reported, 11 I used a score method, dividing the boxes and 
figures as teams and when they matched they gained points." 
The strategies reported by the female subjects were 
more extreme than those of the males. One female reported, 
11 It was the box with the most squares until I was proven 
otherwise." A second subject reported, "Usually I estimated 
for the first 3 or 4 draws and then I decided on a guess." 
A third female reported, "When 2 cues of the same kind were 
drawn I thought it came from that box. 11 
Of the 28 female subjects in the present experiment, 
four expressed that their estimates were based on guessing. 
None of the male subjects reported adopting this approach. 
Six of the female subjects and 9 of the male subjects 
stated that their estimates were determined by the frequency 
of the cues drawn. It is apparent, therefore, that females 
may adopt a more extreme strategy than males. 
A number of problems were evident in the methodology 
of the present experiment. The first is concerned with 
biased cue sampling as a result of the nature of the figures 
themselves. Since a square occupies twice as much area as 
a right triangle, the length of the legs of the triangle 
being equal to the length of the sides of the square, the 
box with the proportion of 600 squares and 400 triangles in 
it actually contained an area ratio of 600 square inches to 
200 square inches. Even though there were 3 squares in the 
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box for every 2 triangles, the squares actually occupy 
three times as much area as the triangles. In the box 
with 600 triangles and 400 squares the area ratio was 300 
square inches to 400 square inches in favor of the squares. 
When sampling these figures from a wooden box with a pair 
of eyebrow tweezers it seems plausible to assume that the 
area inside the box occupied by each figure will influence 
which figures are drawn out. It could therefore be expected 
that more squares than triangles would be sampled regardless 
of which box was being used. Table 3 presents a breakdown 
of the cues actually sampled on each trial in the present 
experiment. It is evident from this table that more squares 
were sampled on each of the 10 trials. 
The present writer is therefore suggesting that the 
lack of differences found between the amount of conservatism 
exhibited between the male and female subjects of the 
present experiment might be partially attributable to the 
lack of ambiguity associated with the sampled cues. It would 
not be expected that the subjects would record high proba-
bility estimates for the box with the greater proportion of 
triangles in it if twice as many squares had actually been 
sampled. An experimental situation where more ambiguity 
was present with respect to the available alternatives might 
result in the differences found between males and females 
as in the Kogan and Wallach research. Careful design of 
the particular cues used would be an important factor in 
future research. 
Squares and right-triangles were used in the present 
study to permit easy discrimination on the part of the sub-
jects. A second methodological problem evident in this study 
was with the displaying of these cues. Since each displayed 
square occupied twice as much area on the screen as a dis-
played triangle, projected draws of 50:50 may not have been 
perceived as such by the subjects. Such a draw may appear 
to contain more squares than triangles. An example of this 
situation in the present study was on trial 9. Even though 
the cues were sampled with equal frequency, the projection 
area occupied by the squares was twice that of the triangles. 
The possibility that this type of draw would be misrepre-
sented to the subjects is reflected in the results that only 
17 of the 43 subjects in this experiment recorded estimates 
of 50:50 on this trial. Research is therefore needed to 
investigate the method of presentation of information to the 
subjects in this type of situation. 
In summary, the present experiment offers evidence to 
support the conclusion th.at in a Bayesian probability situa-
tion, estimates made by the subjects would fail to be 
equivalent to estimates computed by Bayes' theorem. The 
present author, however, is hesitant to accept these results 
as evidence th.at human beings are "suboptimal" processors of 
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information. Of the 430 estimates used to examine the 
present results, thirteen were above the corresponding 
Bayesian estimates. If Bayesian estimates depict 11 optimal11 
behavior, then these thirteen estimates represent "optimal-
plus" behavior. In other words, these estimates represent 
behavior which is superior to optimal behavior. This contra-
diction is therefore suggestive of further research to 
investigate the adequacy of Bayes' theorem as a normative 
model in this type of situation. 
Secondly, this study failed to offer evidence that 
females would be more conservative than males. The present 
data does depict that males were more conservative than 
females on 7 of the 10 trials; however, these differences 
failed to reach significance. 
This study does offer evidence that males adopt more 
risky but less extreme strategies in problem solving than 
females. Further research is needed to investigate the 
specific types of strategies employed by males and females 
and the effect that these strategies have on subjective 
estimates. Siegel, Siegel, and Andrews (1964) report that 
men tend to adopt strategies which maximize utility, in 
decision making situation; however, they stress that 
11 
••• now research is needed to examine the generality of 
the findings (of their research) for both sexes." 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
You have volunteered to perform tonight a task in a 
psychological experiment. We appreciate your interest in 
our project and wish to thank all of you for donating your 
time this evening to our efforts. 
The two red boxes you see setting on the table in 
the front of the room will be used. Each box contains a 
mixture of small cardboard geometric figures. The chart 
you see underneath the boxes summarizes the contents of 
each box. The box with the yellow square painted on it 
contains 600 square figures and 400 right triangle figures. 
The box with the yellow right triangle painted on it con-
tains 600 right triangles and 400 squares. 
For each trial we are going to draw 18 pairs of 
figures out of one of the boxes. As each pair is drawn out 
we will ask you to report which box you think we are using 
and to numerically record 11 how sure" you are that we are 
using that box. You will be told at the end of the "trial" 
which box we are using. There will be a total of 10 trials. 
I will now summarize what has been said so far. Each 
time we draw a pair of figures out of the box you will be 
asked to do two things. First, you are to form opinions as 
to which box you think we are using. Your first opinion 
will refer to the box with the 600 squares in it. Your 
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second opinion will refer to the box with the 600 triangles 
in it. Secondly, you are to assign a numerical estimate to 
each opinion. These estimates will indicate 11 how sure" you 
are as to which box we are using. Both your opinions and 
how sure you are of them are to be recorded on the record 
sheets provided. 
The projection that is now on the screen in the front 
of the room shows you what the record sheet looks like. On 
the left side of the sheet there are three lines with a 
square above the top line. On this side of the sheet you 
will record how sure you are that we are using the box with 
600 squares in it. On the right side of the sheet are three 
more lines with a right triangle above the top line. On 
these lines you will record how sure you are that we are 
using the box with 600 right triangles in it. The zero on 
the left side of the lines means that there is no chance 
that we could be using that box. The 100 on the right side 
of the lines means that you are absolutely sure that this 
is the box we are using. Anytime that you aren't able to 
record a O or a 100, in other words, anytime you are not 
absolutely sure as to which box we are using, you will 
record "how sure" you are somewhere on the lines between 
the O and the 100. Where on the line for each box you 
record "how sure" you are depends upon how strongly you 
feel about your opinions concerning each box. The only 
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requirement is that each time we draw out a pair of figures, 
the two numbers you record, one on each line, must sum or 
add up to 100. 
You will notice that between each pair of lines are 
the numbers 1, 2, and 3. This means that your first esti-
mates will be made on the pair of lines numbered one, your 
second estimates (after we have drawn out the second pair of 
figures) will be made on the pair of lines numbered two, 
your third pair of estimates (after we have drawn out a 
third pair of figures) will be made on the lines numbered 
three. 
I will now summarize what you are to do. To begin a 
11 trial11 we will draw, from the box to be used on the trial, 
one pair of figures. At this time you will be asked to form 
opinions and record "how sure" you are of them. You might 
not be too sure as to which box we are using. However, it 
is important that you make the best guess or estimates that 
you can. After you record your estimates we will draw out 
two more figures and show these to you. We will then ask 
you to record two more estimates. This procedure will be 
followed for all 18 pairs of figures. 
To record how sure you are of your opinions place a 
mark on each of the lines and write in above each mark the 
number that the mark stands for. It is necessary that you 
write the numbers above the marks since the lines are not 
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marked off in equal units (10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, etc.). 
A brief demonstration of the task will now be given. 
Suppose that the first two figures drawn out of the 
box are a square and a triangle. You might feel that with 
only this information given, one square and one triangle, 
that the chances are equal that we could be using either 
box. Therefore, you might want to mark a 50 on each line. 
Since there is already a mark in the middle of each line to 
indicate where 50 is, it would be necessary only to write 
in 50 above this mark on each of the lines. Notice that 
50 + 50 = 100, which satisfies the requirement stated 
earlier. After you have written in your numbers we would 
proceed by drawing out two more figures. Now with the informa-
tion of 4 figures to go by, you would record two more esti-
mates on the lines with the 2 between them. This would be 
done the same as for the first pair of figures, by placing 
a mark on each of the lines and writing the number the mark 
stands for above each mark. The same procedure would be 
followed for the third pair of figures. 
The record sheet for the first trial follows this 
page. You may now turn this page. Remember, even though 
you may not be sure as to which box we are using, please 
make the best estimates that you can. After the 18th pair 
of figures is drawn we will show you which box we are using. 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
It would be appreciated by the experimentors if you 
would take a few minutes to fill out this brief question-
naire pertaining to tonight's task. We are interested pri-
marily in what you thought of the task and what approach 
you felt worked best for you. 
1. Did you find the task interesting? (Briefly explain 
your answer.) 
2. Did you feel that it was challenging? (Explain) 
3. What was your particular approach to deciding which 
box we were using? 
4. What phenomena do you think the experimenters are 
studying? (Your opinion, please) 
5. Would you like to receive a classroom explanation as 
to what we are studying and why this particular task 
was employed? 
